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ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 epidemic is the latest evidence of critical 
gaps in our collective ability to monitor country- level 
preparedness for health emergencies. The global 
frameworks that exist to strengthen core public health 
capacities lack coverage of several preparedness domains 
and do not provide mechanisms to interface with local 
intelligence. We designed and piloted a process, in 
collaboration with three National Public Health Institutes 
(NPHIs) in Ethiopia, Nigeria and Pakistan, to identify 
potential preparedness indicators that exist in a myriad 
of frameworks and tools in varying local institutions. 
Following a desk- based systematic search and expert 
consultations, indicators were extracted from existing 
national and subnational health security- relevant 
frameworks and prioritised in a multi- stakeholder two- 
round Delphi process. Eighty- six indicators in Ethiopia, 87 
indicators in Nigeria and 51 indicators in Pakistan were 
assessed to be valid, relevant and feasible. From these, 
14–16 indicators were prioritised in each of the three 
countries for consideration in monitoring and evaluation 
tools. Priority indicators consistently included private sector 
metrics, subnational capacities, availability and capacity 
for electronic surveillance, measures of timeliness for 
routine reporting, data quality scores and data related to 
internally displaced persons and returnees. NPHIs play an 
increasingly central role in health security and must have 
access to data needed to identify and respond rapidly to 
public health threats. Collecting and collating local sources 
of information may prove essential to addressing gaps; it 
is a necessary step towards improving preparedness and 
strengthening international health regulations compliance.
INTRODUCTION
In December 2019, a cluster of patients were 
admitted to hospitals in Wuhan, China, with 
an initial diagnosis of pneumonia of unknown 
aetiology.1 The cluster was epidemiologically 
linked to a local seafood and wet animal 
wholesale market, suggestive of zoonotic 
spill over.2 One thought experiment asks: 
what would have happened if the vendors at 
the now- infamous Huanan Seafood Whole-
sale Market had to send a weekly report to a 
market inspector containing information on 
the health of each vendor? And what if one 
indicator, ‘number of vendors with suspected 
illness’, was collected by local health authori-
ties on a routine basis? Well, if this would have 
happened and this ‘non- traditional’ indi-
cator was also monitored by a central public 
health authority, the outcomes for the 2019 
SARS- CoV-2 outbreak could have been very 
different.
The architecture of many traditional public 
health monitoring systems was not designed to 
detect non- human disease specific signals; but 
it is exactly these signals that can be collected 
Summary box
 ► Existing global frameworks to strengthen public 
health core capacities lack indicators to measure 
several preparedness domains and do not provide 
mechanisms to interface with local intelligence.
 ► In collaboration with three National Public Health 
Institutes (NPHIs) in Ethiopia, Nigeria and Pakistan, 
we designed and piloted a rapid framework review 
and Delphi consultative process to identify, assess 
and prioritise non- traditional subnational indicators 
to improve preparedness monitoring.
 ► The demonstrated methodology can strengthen the 
leadership role of NPHIs in health security without 
the added burden of developing new indicators or 
collecting new data.
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at a local level and then reported upward—that need to be 
assessed for their utility as part of national preparedness 
efforts. Without the systems in place to bridge national 
and subnational capacities for better preparedness, local-
ised health events will remain undetected until the signal 
becomes loud enough to be picked up by the existing 
public health infrastructure. Strengthening early detec-
tion is essential for the public health entities responsible 
for preventing, detecting and responding to infectious 
disease outbreaks; having robust and timely data are the 
only way to benefit from the extra weeks or days that may 
be gained from earlier detection and that are so critical 
to controlling an infectious disease outbreak. There is a 
wealth of data routinely collected across a range of indi-
cators and using a variety of monitoring and evaluation 
tools and programmes. These data are not readily acces-
sible and the mechanisms to understand and effectively 
analyse and use the data in decision- making for national 
health security and preparedness is lacking.
Limitations of the Joint External Evaluation tool for assessing 
country preparedness
With wide participation from 113 WHO Member States, 
the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) has become a mean-
ingful exercise to attune national interests and promote 
cross- sectoral coordination to strengthen International 
Health Regulations (IHR) capacities. IHR monitoring 
framework includes the State Party annual reporting 
process and voluntary external evaluation using the JEE 
tools, after- action reviews and simulation exercises.3 A key 
tool within the WHO’s IHR monitoring framework, the 
JEE uniquely convenes national actors across sectors and 
is externally validated by peer country experts. While it 
elevates the visibility of health emergency preparedness, 
it is a large resource- intense multi- sectoral exercise that 
is logistically difficult to perform annually—the recom-
mended frequency is every 4–5 years.4 The challenge is 
that outbreaks do not stop.
The JEE indicators have been found to accurately 
measure essential public health functions, such as 
disease surveillance and laboratory capacity as well as 
health threats stemming from communicable disease at 
the national level,5 but the first edition JEE, which has 
been used most extensively, did not consider much on 
the subnational capacities, cross- border outbreaks or 
integrate animal health surveillance data (beyond known 
zoonotic diseases)—even though the preponderance of 
emerging infections have zoonotic origins.5 Also, this 
process convenes national leaders without much repre-
sentation from subnational levels or the informal and 
private sectors.6
These limitations can lead to lapses in national health 
security knowledge and awareness, which results in a 
skewed understanding of global health preparedness 
writ large—this has already been noted in other ‘global’ 
preparedness tools such as the Global Health Security 
Index.7 The SARS- CoV-2 pandemic is the latest evidence 
that national preparedness and global health security 
must be underpinned not only by essential technical 
capacities but also local multi- sectoral public health 
intelligence and behavioural health data, which must be 
accessed and analysed in order for governments to take 
early action to respond to acute threats and crises.8–12
Local data and National Public Health Institutes
The International Association for National Public Health 
Institutes (IANPHI) includes membership from National 
Public Health Institutes (NPHIs) in 99 countries.13 In 
many contexts NPHIs were first established because of, 
and in response to, public health challenges typically 
related to infectious diseases and house the capaci-
ties to effective monitoring of national health security 
and preparedness, including surveillance, evaluating 
and analysing health information, and epidemiological 
research.14 In recent times, the breadth of programmes 
and activities undertaken by NPHIs globally has expanded 
as they confront new threats and risks to public health, 
evolve their vision and mandate, and respond to leader-
ship and political priorities.14 Thus, NPHIs are increas-
ingly being positioned as the main agency to monitor, 
evaluate and report on various aspects of national and 
subnational preparedness, playing a critical role in global 
health security.15–17
The structures of NPHIs vary, with many NPHIs existing 
within Ministries of Health; yet, many have limited access 
to non- health emergency related data. Even when a 
national integrated disease system exists, there is still 
potentially useful data that stays within disease- specific 
programmes and information systems. The siloed 
nature of data and the limitations of data sharing are 
often mirrored subnationally and amplified at the inter- 
sectoral level. For example, organisations that manage 
humanitarian crises can provide important information 
on internally displaced persons, as well as refugee move-
ments.18 19
Very few NPHIs have access to these data. In part due 
to lack of a mechanism in place to enable the effective 
use of this data for decision- making.20 COVID-19 has 
shown us that this fragmentation is a problem for even 
the best resourced NPHIs, as insufficient data have 
hampered many countries responses.21 22 If NPHIs are 
to have robust public health intelligence to detect and 
even predict disease outbreaks they must be positioned 
to access, analyse and act on health security relevant data 
from all relevant sources.23 24
In 2018, a pilot project was developed through the 
collaboration and input of several NPHIs and partners 
to strengthen national accountability for preparedness.
Its primary objective was to ascertain if national moni-
toring and evaluation of preparedness could be strength-
ened by the identification of priority indicators that are 
not part of the JEE. Additionally, the pilot sought to iden-
tify local indicators collected regularly by non- NPHI enti-
ties and test whether NPHIs could access these indicators. 
The aim was to improve national situational awareness of 
potential health- impacting events. The objectives of this 
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paper are to detail the methodological approach used to 
identify and prioritise indicators for the aforementioned 
pilot project and to provide examples of frameworks and 
indicators not currently monitored or collected in tradi-
tionally used global health assessment tools.
PROCESS FOR IDENTIFYING LOCAL NON-TRADITIONAL 
INDICATORS
This section summarises the steps taken to identify a set 
of locally specific JEE- complementary priority indicators 
that can be monitored by NPHIs to increase situational 
awareness for preparedness. To understand the need and 
utility for these indicators three NPHIs collaborated to 
pilot these methods: the Ethiopian Public Health Insti-
tute, the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and the Paki-
stan National Institute of Health. The specific activities to 
achieve these aims were:
1. Definition of JEE- gap areas
2. Rapid review for global gap- relevant indicator- based 
frameworks.
3. Identification of national level indicator- based frame-
works.
4. A two- round Delphi process to prioritise indicators for 
pilot country NPHI monitoring and evaluation plans.
Five a priori JEE- gap areas were applied as parameters 
to conduct all peer- reviewed and grey literature searches 
and characterise all outputs (table 1). Gap areas were 
created and identified through iterative consultative 
meetings with Chatham House and Geneva Institute, 
IANPHI and partners, and relevant teams from the WHO 
Health Emergencies Programme. Additionally, each gap 
area was considered in light of three crosscutting themes: 
cross- border coordination, subnational preparedness 
and One Health. A maximum of two gap areas were 
selected per NPHI: the first gap area ‘travel and trade’ 
was selected by the WHO stakeholders in Geneva and the 
second gap area was selected by the piloting NPHI (ie, 
‘knowledge and data sharing’ for Pakistan and Ethiopia 
and ‘health systems resilience’ for Nigeria). This ensured 
that the project aligned with both national, regional and 
global preparedness priorities.
This pilot was executed through a two- stage process to 
identify and prioritise potential indicators. The Identifi-
cation and Prioritisation stages were codeveloped between 
the Project Team and all three NPHIs to decide (i) the 
criteria to assess the indicators, (ii) the criteria to prior-
itise indicators, (iii) the stakeholders who should be 
involved in the process and (iv) what methods should be 
used to prioritise indicators. The research questions that 
guide the presented methods and the process to identify 
and prioritise indicators are further illustrated in figure 1.
STAGE 1: IDENTIFICATION OF FRAMEWORKS AND INDICATORS
Framework search: global-level frameworks (rapid review)
Global gap- relevant frameworks (ie, conceptual docu-
ment with indicators and/or targets intended to guide 
data collection to measure outputs and outcomes) were 
systematically identified using Medline and Google (see 
box 1 for search terms used). Preferred Reporting Items 
for Systematic Reviews and Meta- Analyses guidelines were 
applied to Medline results and only the first 50 results 
from Google were reviewed. Abstracts were reviewed, and 
in some cases the first page and methods were screened 
for relevance. Inclusion and exclusion criteria were 
applied to the search results (box 2).
Searches were supplemented purposively by frame-
works known to be used and implemented by key institu-
tions involved in global health security and preparedness 
(eg, WHO, World Bank). Experts from institutions with 
interests in preparedness for global health security were 
also consulted.
Table 1 Preparedness gap areas definitions used for 
methodology
Definition Gap area
Political and financial 
commitment 
(sustainability)
Track whether sufficient resources 
have been committed and structures 




Assess the extent to which 
individual components supporting 
IHR capacity come together to 
strengthen the health system
Research and 
development
Mechanisms to track research 
that may guide implementation, or 
provide new tools during a health 
emergency
Knowledge and data 
sharing
Monitor capacity to share 
knowledge and data being 
generated as part of preparedness 
measures during outbreaks or other 
period of need
Trade and travel 
restrictions
Monitor outbreak- related travel or 
trade restrictions
IHR, International Health Regulations.
Figure 1 Research questions and methodology for 
identification and prioritisation stages.
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Framework search: national level frameworks
National level frameworks were identified by first 
compiling a list of ‘common’ frameworks regularly and 
routinely used by countries to monitor the capacity of the 
health system to prepare for, prevent, detect and respond 
to public health threats. Furthermore, resource websites, 
such as the MEASURE Evaluation Health Information 
Systems Strengthening Resource Centre were reviewed.25 
These lists were then adapted and supplemented with 
gap- relevant framework recommendations provided 
by experts and key stakeholders in each pilot country, 
including health and non- health actors, government and 
private entities, and academic institutions.
All frameworks were analysed using a standard template 
to extract information about authorship/ownership, 
year of publication, source of framework, inclusion of 
(measurable) indicators and relevance to at least one 
of the five gap areas and one of the three cross- cutting 
themes.
Indicator extraction
Two members of the Project Team reviewed the national 
frameworks and datasets, and extracted indicators based 
on an assessment of their relevance to: preparedness, 
global health security, the gap areas of interest to the 
NPHI, and the WHO- selected ‘trade and travel restric-
tions’ gap area. For this project, relevance is defined as 
the appropriateness of an indicator for informing (sub) 
national monitoring of preparedness information.26 27 An 
indicator is relevant if it (i) reflects the ability to monitor 
local/subnational data sources for national (domestic) 
and (ii) is highly applicable to public health security and 
selected preparedness gap area. Additionally, to guide 
alignment to national realities within the gap area, indi-
cators were categorised into preparedness domains and 
subdomains (table 2).
STAGE 2: PRIORITISATION OF INDICATORS
Between January and March 2019, a two- round modified 
Delphi process, similar to Boulkedid et al,28 was imple-
mented to capture expert input for the selection and 
prioritisation of indicators for each gap area.
Delphi round 1: indicator assessment (to narrow selection)
To assess the validity (For this project, validity is defined 
as the degree to which the data measures what the indi-
cator claims.29 An indicator is valid if there is (i) adequate 
evidence and professional consensus to support it and (ii) 
identifiable benefits to providing information on events 
that have potential meaningful impact on human or 
animal health.) and feasibility (For this project, feasibility 
is defined as if the information needed to assess is likely 
to be available at the data source provided.) of the indi-
cators, a peer- review panel was formed of representatives 
from the three pilot NPHIs, the Project Team and three 
non- pilot NPHIs: the Robert Koch Institute (Germany), 
the National Institute for Public Health and the Envi-
ronment (Netherlands) and the Norwegian Institute of 
Public Health. In total there were 12 panel members, 
all who were experts in preparedness and surveillance 
within their respective NPHIs. The indicators were 
grouped by subdomain and country and divided among 
panel members. Indicators were scored on validity and 
feasibility using a 9- point Likert scale, where a score of 
‘1’ is ‘definitely not valid’ or ‘definitely not feasible’ and 
a score of 9 is ‘definitely valid’ or ‘definitely feasible’. 
Indicators that scored in the top two tertiles (ie, 4–6 and 
7–9) passed the first round of Delphi and were included 
in the second round. An example of the spreadsheet 
Box 1 Medline and Google search terms
Primary terms: health security OR health systems.
Secondary terms: monitoring and evaluation OR indicators OR 
monitoring framework OR monitoring tool OR framework OR tool OR 
assessment.
Tertiary terms: political and financial commitment OR health systems 
resilience OR research and development OR knowledge and data 
sharing OR trade and travel restrictions.
Box 2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria for frameworks
Inclusion criteria
1. Published within the last 10 years.
2. Contains quantifiable measurable indicators.
3. Relevant to at least one of the five gap areas and at least one cross- 
cutting theme.
4. Able to be collected within country.
5. Must be responsive to an outbreak, that is, possible to set a base-
line, and make it possible to declare an outbreak.
Exclusion criteria
1. Theoretical indicators; data must have been shown to be collecta-
ble and/or has been implemented before.
Table 2 Domains and subdomains used to categorise 
indicators
Preparedness domains   Subdomains









1. Cross- sector/community 
collaboration
3. Incident management 1. Emergency operations 
coordination
2. Multi- agency coordination
4. Information 
management
1. Communication (ie, 
dissemination of accurate and 
timely information)
2. Structure and organisation of 
information exchange
3. Analysis and interpretation of 
health- related data
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used during Delphi round 1 is provided in online supple-
mental appendix 1.
Delphi round 2: indicator prioritisation
In collaboration with each NPHI, an in- country work-
shop was held to prioritise the selected indicators 
within each of the gap areas. The aim of the workshop 
was to prioritise gap- area indicators that could be used 
to inform NPHI monitoring and evaluation objectives 
and strategies, to strengthen preparedness monitoring 
and health system readiness. The workshop convened a 
variety of stakeholders from across the public and private 
sectors, in health and non- health fields, and experts in 
sectors related to the country’s selected gap areas, online 
supplemental appendix 2 details which expert types were 
requested and represented. For the second round Delphi 
panel there were 21 experts in Ethiopia, 25 in Nigeria 
and 35 in Pakistan. Contextual insights from the country 
prioritisation workshops are provided in box 3.
Participants in the workshop were arranged in multi- 
sectoral groups and were tasked with conducting an 
assessment on all indicators that had passed the first stage 
of the Delphi process by applying predefined criteria 
that was defined in collaboration with pilot country leads 
(online supplemental appendix 3). The participant 
groups were further asked to identify which indicators 
should be labelled as ‘core’ indicators—these would be 
included into the monitoring and evaluation framework 
for their NPHI and tested during a subsequent part of 
the project. The scoring template used for Delphi round 
2 is provided in online supplemental appendix 4.
NON-TRADITIONAL PREPAREDNESS DATA: WHERE ARE THEY 
AND WHAT CAN THEY TELL US?
Global search findings
Before screening, over 200 frameworks were identified 
and after the screening 37 frameworks were kept for 
analysis. The selected frameworks represent many diverse 
sources where data may be held, including government 
agencies, vertical disease programmes, academic insti-
tutions, non- government organisations, international 
donors and multilateral organisations, and private health 
or non- health industries (table 3).
Similar numbers of frameworks were identified across 
global (n=10), regional (n=8) and national levels (n=19). 
Global- level frameworks were developed by a ‘global’ 
institution such as multilateral organisations, and had 
been recommended for all countries, for example, The 
Commonwealth’s’ Health Protection Policy Toolkit Health as an 
Essential Component of Global Security.30 Regional frame-
works provided indicators to be used in countries from 
the same geographical block, for example, Integrating 
Financing for Health Security in East Asia Pacific Region 
Concept Note.30 Several frameworks (n=14) had indicators 
that measured multiple gap areas.
Across the five gap areas, ‘health systems resilience’ 
had the highest number of frameworks (18/37) followed 
by ‘political and financial commitment’ with 13 frame-
works (figure 2). ‘Research and development’ and 
‘knowledge and data sharing’ both had nine frameworks. 
‘Travel and trade restrictions’ had the least number of 
frameworks with four, and with identified frameworks 
only at the regional and national levels. For the cross- 
cutting themes, 21 frameworks included indicators for 
‘subnational preparedness’ data, followed by ‘cross- 
border coordination’ (n=10) and ‘One Health’ (n=9). 
While distribution was similar across gap areas at both 
the global and national levels, at the regional level only 
one ‘One Health’ framework was identified.
While many of the frameworks feed data back into a 
health system most do not integrate with existing public 
health information systems, for example, the Geopolitical 
Box 3 Contextual insights from country indicator 
prioritisation workshops
Every country has its specific context and cross- sectoral relationships, 
which impact what indicators their national public health institution 
will monitor for preparedness. The three pilot countries ensured that 
their local contexts and political realities influenced how they selected 
and prioritised indicators for this project. Here are contextual insights 
from the Delphi round 2 country prioritisation workshops:
Ethiopia
Ethiopia selected the gap area knowledge and data sharing due 
to their focus on public health emergency management and newly 
established data management centre. Beyond coordinating and 
synthesising health information at a national level, the centre 
ultimately aims to generate evidence to inform national health policies 
and programmes. Participants shared that climate change indicators 
were a national priority due to the impact on livelihoods and migration, 
and selected indicators that could provide information from Woreda 
(district) level from the National Meteorological Agency and then 
potentially shared with public health information systems.
Nigeria
Nigeria selected the gap area health systems resilience due to the 
volume of disease control and response efforts annually undertaken 
by Nigeria CDC. As a federated country, these efforts should be led 
by both national and state public health entities, but due to low 
investments in subnational health systems, this was often not the 
case. Participants discussed if it was possible to track both health 
expenditure as well as health budget allocation indicators. Ultimately, 
it was decided, that it was more feasible to track budgets and 
workforce capacity in order to monitor health system investments at 
state and national levels.
Pakistan
Pakistan selected the gap area knowledge and data sharing due to the 
focus on a new legislation, under the process of approval (the National 
Public Health Act), which formalises data sharing responsibilities. 
At the time of the project, a newly integrated disease surveillance 
programme had been established but the data management system 
was still nascent and many existing systems had yet to integrate or 
exchange information. Thus, the participants focused on indicators 
across sectors that provided information on the completeness and 
reach (eg, rural areas) of reporting systems as well as indicators that 
measured progress in digital health information systems.  on F
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OECD Health Care Quality Framework on Health System 
Performance,31 which provides indicators useful to assess 
healthcare capacity such as Chronic Obstructive Pulmo-
nary Disease hospital admission and healthcare human 
resource numbers.
Several one- time frameworks were also identified; 
these were often generated from publications, projects 
or initiatives from external government entities, such as 
professional networks or universities. The Laboratory Score-
card32 to score national laboratory network functionality 
in resource- constrained countries is an example of this. 
This framework included targets that encompassed regu-
latory frameworks, biosafety and biosecurity, and supply 
chain management, among others.
Many potential indicators came from reporting tools 
and surveys for either broad health information or 
disease specific initiatives, for example, The Global Fund 
Concept Note, which is generated ever 3 years for eligible 
countries33 and requires information on the epidemi-
ology of HIV, tuberculosis and/or malaria, geographical 
health burden and health system indicators. These data 
are often compiled by the respective disease programmes 
and housed within their data systems. Undoubtedly, 
readily available data on vulnerable populations would 
provide important knowledge for national strategic 
disease outbreak preparedness and response.
Framework and indicators at the national level
A total of 37 discrete frameworks were identified in Ethi-
opia, 28 in Nigeria and 40 in Pakistan. For each country, 
framework figures include the 19 common frameworks 
that were also found during the global- level search 
(table 4), but do not include separate reports from the 
implementation of any framework in different states or 
provinces. All countries also identified some national 
frameworks that included indicators for other gap areas 
but not the priority ones.
In terms of framework distribution across country- 
selected gap area: in Ethiopia, 32% (n=12) and in Paki-
stan 40% (n=16) of identified frameworks had indicators 
to collect ‘knowledge and data sharing data’. In Nigeria, 
45% of frameworks had indicators for ‘health system 
resilience’ data. The number of frameworks with WHO- 
selected gap area ‘trade and travel restrictions’ were 
relatively low in Pakistan (n=4, 10%) and Ethiopia (n=8, 
22%). However, in Nigeria, 13 frameworks (45%) with 
indicators relevant to ‘travel and trade restrictions’ were 
identified.
From these frameworks, a total of 120 indicators were 
identified for Ethiopia, 176 for Nigeria and 62 for Paki-
stan. These indicators were reviewed for relevance and 
duplicates by a second reviewer, leaving 86 indicators 
in Ethiopia, 87 indicators in Nigeria and 51 indicators 
in Pakistan that were included in the first Delphi panel. 
After the first Delphi round, 76% (n=65) of indicators 
were retained in Ethiopia and 68% (n=59) in Nigeria 
for the second Delphi round. In Pakistan all indicators 
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to the second round of Delphi (the in- country prioritisa-
tion workshops) (figure 3).
Each country resulted in prioritising between 14 and 
16 indicators (table 5). (As part of the pilot exercise, each 
country was instructed to choose no more than 16 indi-
cators. This was so the other components of the project, 
ie, trying to access indicators, could be completed within 
project timelines.) These indicators were seen as core to 
effective monitoring for preparedness. Prioritisation of 
indicators by local experts revealed that priority indica-
tors are country and context specific and thus this process 
was most useful in selecting indicators to assess national 
preparedness strength and not to compare countries.
The variety of indicators revealed several interesting 
local sources for data including the National Meteoro-
logical Agency in Ethiopia and the Media Regulatory 
Authority in Pakistan. At least 50% of Nigeria and Ethio-
pia’s indicators could be collected at the subnational level 
(green coloured boxes in table 5), while just 38% of Paki-
stan’s could. Certain themes emerged in the types of indi-
cators that all three countries prioritised. These include 
(i) private sector data (especially private laboratories); (ii) 
subnational capacity to respond to public health threats; 
(iii) availability and capacity for electronic surveillance 
tools and systems; (iv) timeliness of routine data at the 
subnational level; (v) data quality scores and (vi) data 
related to internally displaced persons and returnees.
CONCLUSION: NEXT STEPS TO STRENGTHEN NPHIS’ ROLE IN 
NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY
By combining a rapid framework review and systematic 
consultative process to assess indicators, we have demon-
strated a methodology that can be used to identify non- 
traditional indicators to improve national monitoring for 
preparedness. This process can strengthen the NPHI’s 
role as an established authority for health security. This 
approach was designed to optimise the role of the NPHI 
without adding the burden of choosing new indicators or 
collecting new data.
Among the insights already discussed, the absence of 
‘travel and trade restrictions’ frameworks available at all 
levels is an important finding and perhaps provides some 
explanation for the international confusion and the 
Figure 2 Categorisation of frameworks by coverage of gap areas and crosscutting themes.
Table 4 Common frameworks across the pilot countries
1. IHR Self- assessment Annual 
Reporting Tool 2018
2. Strategic Tool for Assessing Risks
3. Rapid or Comprehensive Civil 
Registration and Vital Statistics 
Assessment
4. Service Availability and Readiness 
Assessment
5. Global Fund Concept Note
6. Service Provision Assessment
7. Malaria Indicator Survey
8. Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys
9. Aids Indicator Survey
10. OIE Tool for the Evaluation of 
Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS)
11. Vulnerability Risk Assessment and 
Mapping
12. PVS Gap Analysis Tool
13. GAVI Annual Reporting
14. Demographic Health Survey
15. Assessment tool for core capacity 
requirements at designated airports, ports 
and ground crossings
16. Africa Leaders Malaria Alliance Scorecard
17. Health Sector Monitoring and Evaluation 
Plan
18. Health Security Financing Assessment 
Tool
19. Health Resources Availability Monitoring 
System
GAVI, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; IHR, International Health Regulations; OIE, World Organisation for Animal Health.
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lingering irresolution regarding IHR compliance during 
the early response to the COVID-19 pandemic.34
There were some limitations to our process. The JEE- 
gap areas presented in this paper reflect expert feedback; 
these do not represent comprehensive gaps in public 
health preparedness and there is a need for further 
research to identify others. We used a rapid review to iden-
tify global level frameworks and a convenience sample of 
informants for national level frameworks; this most likely 
resulted in missed frameworks and indicators—this was 
especially noticeable in regards to the lack of granular 
local data (eg, below health facility). This process can also 
be time- intensive. NPHIs may use our key words and iden-
tified frameworks to reduce time or do stage 1 and stage 
2 separately and as needed. National level framework 
identification was heavily influenced by existing relation-
ships held by the NPHI or Project Team. While all coun-
tries had very little involvement from the travel and trade 
industry, Nigeria identified a higher proportion of indi-
cators for that gap area since it had recently completed 
the WHO’s Strategic Tool for Assessing Risks.35 Thus, to 
expand their reach of frameworks within gap areas, coun-
tries should leverage existing multi- sectoral assessments 
as well as consider local datasets identified by district or 
provincial/regional sources. Finally, the second edition 
of the JEE was released in 2019 and has expanded in 
some areas, namely subnational inclusion and zoonotic 
surveillance.4 Although, its frequency and much of its 
indicators remain unchanged and so our process would 
still be beneficial for regularly monitoring preparedness 
at a national level.
The process that we detailed is only a starting point to 
finding data within countries to better inform national 
health security. The present COVID-19 pandemic has 
demonstrated that political will can outweigh even the 
most informed public health process. Other questions 
remain such as: is the NPHI able to collect this data? 
When and how often should this data be collected? And 
how can the selected indicators inform decisions for 
better national preparedness? In another publication20 
we address these questions.
IANPHI is supporting NPHIs to become the estab-
lished lead in health security in their countries. The 
above methodology has been translated into a toolkit 
to support NPHIs. A way forward could also include a 
common framework to use non- traditional data into a 
routine analysis for public health intelligence; the WHO 
Benchmarks for IHR could be useful to this aim.3
Global health security must empower localised 
preparedness and targeted response activities. There-
fore, national health security must routinely monitor 
local data. There is no better time to start.
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Figure 3 Number of indicators selected through the Delphi rounds.
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Table 5 Prioritised core indicators selected by pilot countries
Ethiopia Nigeria Pakistan
1. Number of climate information centres established 1 . Percentage of local government 
areas that submit timely monthly 
surveillance reports
1 . Percentage of districts 
submitting online routine monthly 
reports to provinces, within agreed 
timelines
2. Proportion of community Disaster Risk Response 
committees/task force established members who 
have improved their technical capacity on disease 
risk management (DRM) system
2. Proportion of healthcare workers 
trained/sensitised on integrated 
disease surveillance and response in 
the preceding year
2 . Percentage of reporting units 
achieving satisfactory Data Quality 
Assurance score/mark increased
3. Proportion of regions that have coordination fora 
established and been supported in mainstreaming DRM
3 . Percentage of deaths due to 
notifiable communicable diseases
3 . Percentage of vertical programmes 
integrated with provincial MIS cell
4. Proportion of health facilities that report health 
service data to government reporting system
4. Yellow fever immunisation 
coverage
4 .Percentage of private sector 
hospitals and healthcare facilities 
regularly reporting using Pakistan 
Health Information System
5. Institutionalised and functional data quality assurance 
mechanism at (all) administrative levels
5 . Percentage of States that 
timely submit disease surveillance 
reports
5. Number of districts preparing 
annual health plans of actions 
considering the health issues 
emerging from the information 
system
6. Yearly routine data quality assessment report 
that demonstrates improvement in data quality 
(timeliness, accuracy and completeness of reports) 
including Expanded Programme of Immunisation 
data
6. Full immunisation coverage 6. Is there a policy or strategy that 
makes specific reference to social 
media use in the health domain?
7. Proportion of health administration levels with 
functional Surgical Information Systems by category 
(WorHO, ZHD, RHB)
7. Maternal mortality rate 7. Is there a national policy or 
strategy on the use of social media 
by government organisations?
8. Proportion of health facilities meet the national Health 
Information System (HIS) infrastructure standard by 
category and ownership
8 . Percentage of private health 
providers participating in the 
Nigeria HMIS
8. Is there a national Electronic Health 
Record (EHR) system?
9. Proportion of health Institutions with functional 
e- HMIS (health management information system) 
by category (Health Centre, Hospital, WorHO, ZHD, 
RHB)
9. (i) Community health extension 
workers (CHEWs) and (ii) junior 
CHEWs density per 10 000 
population
9 . Percentage of primary care 
facilities with EHR
10. HIS governance in place including e- Health 10 . Percentage of outbreak alerts 
investigated within 48 hours
10. Is there a national laboratory 
information system?
11. Legislation (approved by parliament) governing 
the collection, processing and dissemination of health 
information in place
11. Proportion of healthcare facilities 
with basic water supply
11. Is there a national pathology 
information system?
12. National data repository and data warehouse 12 . Percentage of health facilities 
that provide minimum health 
package
12. Total agricultural exports (US$)
13. Proportion of reported outbreaks or rumours verified 
and investigated by Woreda Health office
13 . Percentage of federal budget 
allocated to the health sector
13. Statistical capacity indicator 
(composite score assessing the 
capacity of a country’s statistical 
system)
14. Proportion of health facilities submitting daily or 
weekly surveillance reports on time to the district
14 . Percentage of state budget 
allocated to the health sector
14 . Percentage of districts with 
their recognised surveillance 
sites having functional online 
surveillance for vaccine 
preventable diseases
15. Number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) for 
climate- induced reasons
  15. Number of (Afghan) individuals 
returning (to Afghanistan) from 
provinces of Pakistan
16. Livestock vaccinations among households who own 
livestock by place of residence
  16. Number of IDPs
Key - Green: indictors related to systems assessment relying on routine data collected at subnational levels; Orange: national- level 
indicators; Bold text: similar indicators prioritised in multiple countries.
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